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The Constitutional Right of
Association
By CI uAus E. RicE*
Introduction
IT has been accurately observed that we are a nation of joiners."
Alexis de Tocqueville, as early as 1835, concluded that "in no country
in the world has the principle of association been more successfully
used, or more unsparingly applied to a multitude of different objects,
than in America."2 Tocqueville noted the ubiquitous character of
American voluntary associations in the following comments:
Societies are formed to resist enemies which are exclusively of a
moral nature, and to diminish the vice of intemperance: in the
United States associations are established to promote public order,
commerce, industry, morality, and religion; for there is no end
which the human will, seconded by the collective exertions of
individuals, despairs of attaining.3 Americans of all ages, all condi-
tions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations. They have
not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all
take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds-religious,
moral, serious, futile, extensive or restricted, enormous or diminu-
tive. . . .Wherever, at the head of some new undertaking, you
see the Government in France, or a man of rank in England, in the
United States you will be sure to find an association.4
In these general remarks on the underlying right of association, it
is important to note the extent to which the ingrained American asso-
ciative habit has been acknowledged in the fundamental law of the
Constitution. In 1958, the Supreme Court of the United States af-
firmed, for the first time in unmistakable terms, the status of freedom
of association as a fundamental right:
It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the ad-
vancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the
0 A.B., 1953, College of the Holy Cross; LL.B., 1956, Boston College Law School;
LL.M., 1959, New York University; J.S.D., 1962, New York University; Associate
Professor of Law, Fordcham University Law School; member, New York Bar.
1 Schlesinger, Biography of a Nation of joiners, 50 Am. HisT. REv. 1 (1944).
2 1 TocQuEVmLE, DEMOCRAcY IN AMEmcA. 204 (4th ed. Reeves transl. 1841).
8 Id. at 204-05.
4 2 ui. at 114.
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'liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.5
The occasion for this affirmation was an attempt by the State of
Alabama to oust the National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People from that State, ostensibly for that organization's failure
to comply with a statute6 requiring foreign corporations to qualify be-
fore doing intrastate business. The State obtained a court order re-
quiring that the NAACP produce certain records, including a list of
all its Alabama members, on the grounds that such information was
required in order to answer the association's denial that it was con-
ducting intrastate business. On certiorari from a judgment of contempt
for failure to reveal the names, the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the secrecy of the membership list was essential to the freedom of
association of the members and that the order constituted an unwar-
ranted invasion of that freedom.7 For obvious reasons, the individual
members of the NAACP were not parties to the action. The associa-
tion, therefore, asserted both its own alleged constitutional rights and
the constitutional rights of its members. The Court seemed to regard
the association and its members as "in every practical sense identical" s
for the purpose of the association's assertion of the members' right to
silence, a right which would be nullified in the very act of its assertion
by the members themselves. The Supreme Court recognized that "in-
violability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances
be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly
where a group espouses dissident beliefs."9 Most importantly for our
purpose, the Court affirmed, for the first time in unmistakable terms,
the fundamental character of freedom of association as a basic consti-
tutional liberty. In view of the essential character of this freedom, and
the catastrophic effect of disclosure upon the NAACP, the Court found
that the rather tenuous connection between the disclosure of members'
names and the,state's capacity to determine whether the association
was doing intrastate business was insufficient justification for the re-
sultant restriction upon freedom of association.10
5NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
6AIL. CoDE tit. 10, §§ 192-98 (1940).
7 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
8 Id. at 459.
9 Id. at 462.
10 Three times since 1958, the Supreme Court has considered aspects of this
running battle between Alabama and the NAACP. Each time the Court, predictably,
sustained the NAACP's contention. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 360 U.S.
240 (1959) (reversing the Alabama Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the contempt
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In analyzing this newly-asserted freedom of association, notice
should be taken of the tacit recognition which was given to it before
its explicit proclamation in 1958. Although the varieties of voluntary
associations are virtually endless, the development of the basic right
of association may be seen from its evolution with relation to a few
such groups. Today the freedom of association is principally discussed
and applied with reference to labor unions, pressure groups and what,
for want of a better term, we can call subversive associations. But, with
the possible exception of the last named, the legitimacy of each of
these groups has long had the sanction of law to a greater or lesser
degree.
Labor Unions
The labor union, for example, has had a checkered career under
the law. It was not until the era of the Industrial Revolution that the
development of the employment relation brought into existence com-
binations of workmen for the purpose of securing better conditions of
work or payment.11 English common law in the eighteenth century
developed the theory that combined action by workers to raise their
wages was criminal conspiracy. 12 The gist of the offense was the com-
bination, since concededly the workers could individually refuse to
work for less than a certain wage.13 It could be noted that combinations
of workers were not declared per se unlawful, but only those combina-
tions aimed at improving wages and conditions; since there are few
other meaningful purposes of workers' combinations, the distinction is
of little significance.' 4
This treatment of most concerted labor action as criminal con-
order reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the 1958 case); NAACP
v. Gallion, 368 U.S. 16 (1961)(holding that the federal district court should grant
the NAACP a hearing if the state court failed to do so by a specified date); NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964) (reversing a state court order
permanently enjoining the NAACP from doing business, or attempting to qualify to
do business, in Alabama).
11 See GREcoRY, LABOR AND =H LAW 13-14 (2d rev. ed. 1958).
12 Rex v. Eccles, 1 Leach 274, 168 Eng. Rep. 240 (1783); Rex v. Journeymen
Taylors, 8 Mod. 10, 88 Eng. Rep. 9 (1721).
13 See GORGonY, LABOR AND Tm LAw 19 (2d rev. ed. 1958).
14 In Rex v. Journeymen Taylors, 8 Mod. 10, 88 Eng. Rep. 9 (1721) the unlawful
object of the combination was the raising of wages above the rate fixed by a statute;
it was thus a conspiracy to violate a general statutory law, and therefore unlawful; see
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 122 (1842); in Rex v. Eccles, 1
Leach 274, 168 Eng. Rep. 240 (1783) the object does not appear to have been
violative of such an express statute, and Lord Mansfield remarked that "every man
may work at what price he pleases, but a combination not to work under certain prices
is an indictable offence." 1 Leach at 276, 168 Eng. Rep. at 241.
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spiracy was carried over to the American colonies.' 5 Nevertheless, even
in pre-Revolutionary America, there were primitive forms of combina-
tion among wage earners and other workers, and these were some-
times recognized by the law.'6 After the end of the Revolution, the
economic and regional groupings of the people became more sharp.
With the decline of the apprenticeship system, the rise of the factory
system, and the narrowing of the door through which workers had
entered easily into the ranks of employers, the trade union began to
develop as an independent, viable institution.'" These beginnings fore-
shadowed the serious commencement of the labor movement in the
nineteenth century.'8 It is significant that, although the law continued
to regard most concerted labor action as unlawful, there appears to
have been virtually no infliction of criminal penalties upon such action
in the post-Revolutionary period, whether masters or journeymen were
involved.19
It has been said that the American courts in the post-Revolutionary
period regarded all combinations of workers to improve wages and
conditions as criminal conspiracies.20 On the other hand, it has been
urged more precisely that what was forbidden by the American courts
was not the mere combination to improve wages and conditions, and
not even the use of the strike for that limited purpose, but rather the
employment of unlawful means, e.g., picketing, violence, or closed-
shop practices, to attain that end.2
Any remaining doubts as to the attitude of the American courts
toward the right to join labor associations were dissipated by Com-
monwealth v. Hunt.2 The defendants had agreed not to work for any
person who should employ anyone not a member of defendants' asso-
15 See GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw 22 (2d rev. ed. 1958); MoRus, GovERN-
MENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERIcA 137-38 (.1946).
16 See MoRIus, op. cit. supra note 15, at 141, 146, 198-99; IIAYBAc], A HISTORY
or AwNmICAN LABOR 54 (1959).
17 See FAUmENER, AsmmcAN EcoNowic HISTORY 311-15 (1949); Momus, op. cit'
supra note 15, at 200; RAYBACK, op. cit. supra note 16, at 54; WnIGHT, THE BATTLES OF
LABOR 77-78 (1906). :
'8 See 1 CHIrWOOD & OwsLEY, A SHORT. HISTORY OF Trn A.MEc PEoPLE 538
(1945).
19 FAuLNma, op. cit. supra note 17, at 312-13; Momus, op. cit. supra note 15, at
205-06.
2 0 See F. B. DuLLEs, LABOR nAMEBICA 30 (2d rev. ed. 1949); GREGORY, LABOR
AND THE LAW 20-25 (2d rev. ed. 1958); HoaN, GRoups nD THE CoNsTrrUtION 69
(1956); MoRmIs, op. cit. supra note 15, at 206-07.
2 1 PErToO, THE LABOR POLICY OF A FREE SOCIETY 191-92 (1957); Witte, Early
American Labor Cases, 35 YALE. L.J. 825, 825-27 (1926).
2245 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
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ciation. This was held not to be an unlawful purpose or means, and
therefore it was not a criminal conspiracy. Chief Justice Shaw defined
the distinction between the lawfulness of the combination as such and
the lawfulness of its object:
The manifest intent of the association is, to induce all those engaged
in the same occupation to become members of it. Such a purpose is
not unlawful .... But in order to charge all those, who become
members of an association, with the guilt of a criminal conspiracy,
it must be averred and proved that the actual, if not the avowed,
object of the association, was criminal.23
After Commonwealth v. Hunt, the criminal conspiracy theory was
infrequently used in labor cases,24 but this result may well be ascribed
to the inappropriateness of the theory and the fact that the Hunt de-
cision was really a restatement of the general common law, affirming
the right to join labor unions for a lawful purpose, rather than to any
revolutionary influence of the decision.25
While the common law recognized the right of an employee to join
a labor association, it also recognized his right under freedom of con-
tract to execute a so-called yellow-dog contract with his employer
whereby he pledged not to join a union, and the corresponding right
of the employer to insist upon such a contract as a condition of em-
ployment.26 The yellow-dog contract was relegated to the discard by
the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,27 which declared it to be the public
policy of the United States that the employee, as well as the employer,
should "have full freedom of association, self-organization, and desig-
nation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms
and conditions of his employment .... The act went on to render
unenforceable, rather than void, any contract whereby either an em-
ployer or employee agreed not to join an employers' or employees'
associationm29 Earlier, the Railway Labor Act had flatly prohibited
23 Id. at 129.
24 Between 1842 and the Civil War, it was used three times, and was used on
eighteen recorded occasions, between 1863 and 1880. In the 1880's it was used more
often, though most of the cases are unreported. Witte, supra note 21, at 829. " "
25 PETaO, op. cit. supra note 21, at 192; see GREcony, LABOR AND m LAw 27-29
(2d rev. ed. 1958).
26 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917). See also Coppage
v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (state anti-yellow-dog statute declared unconstitutional);
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (federal anti-yellow-dog statute declared
unconstitutional).
27Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70-73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958).
2847 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1958).
2947 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 103 (1958).
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yellow-dog contracts in the railroad industry 0 The invalidation of
yellow-dog contracts involved an attribution to labor unions of a pre-
ferred status among voluntary associations; the invalidation also, of
course, involved an acknowledgment of the general disparity in bar-
gaining power between the would-be employee and the prospective
employer.
The right to join labor associations was reaffirmed beyond question
in the National Industrial Recovery Act,"' the Wagner Act,3 2 and the
amendatory Taft-Hartley Act.33 Moreover, the preferred status of labor
unions among associations was demonstrated by the legal recognition
of a duty on the part of employees to join a union under certain cir-
cumstances. The Wagner Act of 193534 permitted closed-shop agree-
ments, whereunder an employee must be a member of the certified
union at the time he begins employment and must remain so there-
after. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947"5 reaffirmed the Wagner Act policy
in favor of collective bargaining, but it limited compulsory unionism
by prohibiting closed-shop and preferential-hiring agreements. 36 Un-
der Taft-Hartley, the union shop, wherein an employee need not be-
long to a union at the time he is hired, but must join within a specified
period thereafter, is valid when the agreement is made pursuant to
the statutory procedures and when not contrary to state law.37 Simi-
larly to the Wagner Act, which did not legitimize compulsory union-
ism agreements in states in which they were illegal by state law,38 the
Taft-Hartley Act provided:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution
3ORailway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577-87 (1926), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1958), as
amended 45 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. V, 1964); on the affirmation by the War Labor
Conference Board, in World War I, of the right to join a union, see MEwz, LABOR
Porscy OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNUMNT 27 (1945).
31 National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 701-12
(1958), declared unconstitutional on other grounds in Schechter v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935).32 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449-57 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66
(19.58).
83Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136-52 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
67; see Mrrus & BRoWN, FRom THE WAGNER AcT TO TAFr-HARTLEY 373-93 (1960).
3449 Stat. 449-57 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1958).
385 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1958).
36 NLRB v. Shuck Constr. Co., 243 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1957); Local 466, Elec.
Workers, 126 N.L.R.B. 110 (1960); Carpenter & Skaer, 93 N.L.R.B. 188 (1951).
37Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1958), as amended 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (Supp.
V, 1964). See Public Serv. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 418, 420 (1950).
38 Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S.
301, 313-14 (1949).
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or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor orga-
nization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in
which such execution or application is prohibited by State or
Territorial law.89
At this writing, nineteen states have right-to-work laws with their
sanction of voluntary unionism and their recognition of the right not
to join a labor union.40 Right-to-work laws have been sustained by the
Supreme Court against constitutional attack on grounds of free speech,
peaceable assembly and petition, equal protection, due process, and
impairment of contract.41 The freedom of choice of the individual em-
ployee was further recognized in subsequent cases in which the Su-
preme Court curtailed the power of unions, operating under union-
shop agreements, to use compulsorily-paid dues money for political
purposes disapproved by the dues-paying member.4
In short, it can be readily seen that the recognition in fundamental,
statutory and case law of the right of labor association is no creature
of the last decade. Nor is the basic right to join such groups even a
creature of this century, although it has been only in the last fifty years
that the effectiveness of its exercise has been ensured. In the process,
labor unions have been accorded considerable powers, e.g., to compel
membership, not granted to other voluntary groups. Analytically, the
granting to unions, which are certified as bargaining agents, of power
to represent and bind nonmembers and the power to compel mem-
bership or the payment of dues through union security devices, in-
volves an attribution or delegation of governmental power to the
43union.
The foregoing cursory summary of the legal development of the
right of labor association illustrates the long-standing nature of the
right and the continuing tensions in the law between the unions and
management on the one hand and between the unions and their mem-
s9 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 14(b), 61 Stat. 151
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1958).40 Ala., Ariz., Ark., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Kan., Miss., Neb., Nev., N.C., N.D., S.C.,
S,D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Va., and Wyo.
41AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949); Lincoln Fed. Labor
Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
42 Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
43 Compare Railway Employes' Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 231-32
(1956), in which the Supreme Court recognized that the private collective bargaining
agreement, implemented by federal enforcement machinery, is subject to the first and
fifth amendments which bind the federal government. See also Lathrop v. Donohue,
367 U.S. 820 (1961) (similar questions are raised by the integrated bar),.
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bers on the other. There are some observers who still discuss the labor
problem in language more suited to the intellectual barricades of
the 1930's than to the realities, of the present day. On the contrary, it
is increasingly obvious that the major current problems in this area
are those created by the continuing excessive hypostatization of the
labor union itself. Harold Laski warned of the dangers attendant upon
an undue submergence of the individual in the group:
I do not think the importance of this approach can be exaggerated.
It makes us see ... that behind all collective entities, however vast,
however ancient, however precious they may be regarded by their
members, are always individual men and women, and that it is the
will of each of these that lends to the collective "person" whatever
strength "it" has. . . . I agree with the view Professor Cohen so
strongly held that only by a continuous 'emphasis that men and
women alone are persons can we make responsibility real in the
relations of community life. As soon as we personify the idea,
whether it is a country or a church, a trade union or an employers'
association, we obscure individual responsibility by transferring
emotional loyalties to a fictitious creation which then acts upon us
psychologically as an obstruction, especially in times of crisis, to
the critical exercise of a reasoned judgment.44
To state that labor unions, the most prominent of all "voluntary"
associations, are enormously powerful today, is to belabor the ob-
vious. Nevertheless, the reality is a source of legitimate concern, for
the conclusion is fair that from the aggrandizement of those groups the
public interest and the individual members' freedom of action can
suffer much. Labor unions have been the steady beneficiaries of favor-
able court decisions.45 And, perhaps most importantly, they are prac-
tically exempt from the strictures of the antitrust laws which are
enforced against business enterprises.46 Labor unions are deeply in-
volved in politics, almost entirely in behalf of the Democratic Party.4T
44 Laski, Morris Cohei's Approach to Legal Philosophy, 15 U. Cm. L. BEV. 575,
581 (1948).
45 See, e.g., NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760,
377 U.S. 58 (1964), in which the Court, employing a strained distinction between prod-
uct picketing and enterprise picketing, expanded the power of unions to employ second-
ary consumer picketing as a means of secondary boycott.
46 See F. PTERsON, AwMERCAN I.Ano UNiONs 105 (1963). The recent proposal
by Walter Reuther that his United Auto Workers Union, with nearly 1,200,000 mem-
bers, merge with the 300,000 member International Union of Electrical Workers would
have raised, if giant corporations rather than giant unions had been involved, con-
siderably more private, and even governmental, protest than actually occurred. See
N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1965, p. 35, col. 1; id., Feb. 11, 1965, p. 25, col. 1. See also
discussion in column by David Lawrence, N.Y. Herald-Tribune, Feb. 12, 1965, p. 19.
47 See F. PETznsoN, Asmucax LaBoa UNioNs 182-85 (1963); N.Y. Times, Nov.
8, 1964, p. 77, col. 1.
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This raises questions transcending even the elemental issues of fair-
ness posed by their use of compulsorily-extracted dues for political
purposes of which their members disapprove.4 8 For if the labor lead-
ers have contributed indispensably to the successful waging of a
Presidential campaign, who can blame them for expecting official
benevolence in return for services rendered?49
The repeal of Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act 0 is one item
on labor's legislative program. 1 This repeal would cause the invalida-
tion of the nineteen state right-to-work laws, with a consequent limi-
tation of the employee's freedom not to associate and his basic civil
right of choice. 52
The exaltation of the group, at the expense of the member, as
exemplified by the labor union experience, is a fit subject for analy-
sis. For it highlights the truth that in an ordered and free society, in-
termediate groups, functioning on a level between the individual and
his government, are merely means to an end, the common good of
their members and society. The welfare of those groups ought not to
be an end in itself. For another instance, it ill behooves us, in the face
of the inherent wrong and the dire results of racial discrimination, to
be complacent about the apparent role of some labor unions in perpe-
tuating that discrimination. While intermediate groups, including
labor unions, exist for the benefit of their members, they owe duties as
well to society at large. It is fair to say that the cause of equal govern-
ment under law could well be served by an emphatic reaffirmation
that, while labor unions are desirable, they are above neither the
law nor the rights of their members and other persons.
48 See cases cited note 42 supra.
49 "The Department of Labor has become an adjunct of the AFL-CIO and the
Secretary of Labor is told what to do by the union chieftains. John A. Grimes, Labor-
Relations Specialist for the Wall Street Journal, writes as follows: 'W. Willard Wirtz
is discovering that being Secretary of Labor often also requires being labor's Secretary.
Put another way, Mr. Wirtz is getting some practical lessons in how his freedom
of action can be sharply curbed by the wants of the AFL-CIO. The federation feels
such a strong proprietary interest in the Johnson administration's activities that it
claims a veto power over Mr. Wirtz. Three times in recent weeks the Secretary has
started out to do something and has found the considerable bulk of federation president
George Meany blocking the way."' Column by David Lawrence, N.Y. Herald-Tribune,
Feb. 12, 1965, p. 19.
5061 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1958).
51 N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1965, p. E5, col. 4. President Johnson has indicated his
support for the repeal of section 14(b) in his State of the Union Message, id., Jan.
5, 1964, p. 17, col. 1.
52 "(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association." UNvmsAL DECLARATiON
oF Huix EaIGns art. 20.
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Pressure Groups
The right to form and join a political party has long been recog-
nized as a fundamental one, whether as a corollary of the constitu-
tional right of suffrage,5 3 or the rights of assembly and petition,54 or
simply as a right inherent in a free people.55 A related but more im-
portant type of association, in terms of contemporary constitutional
controversy, is the pressure group. Broadly speaking, it is fair to say
that an affirmation of a fundamental right to join and support pressure
groups carries with it a recognition of similar rights relating to less
contentious voluntary groups such as fraternal and social organizations.
Therefore, an evaluation of the extent to which the pressure group and
its members are protected by the Constitution will be helpful in
assessing the constitutional status of voluntary associations in general.
The private pressure group is familiar, not only as a lever for
influencing legislators and officials, but also as a source of information
for their guidance in formulating public policy.56 Because the func-
tions of the pressure groups have become so essential in the political
process, the right to form and join such organizations, although not
absolute, is fundamental and constitutionally protected.57 The right
to associate in pressure groups may be traced to the right of petition.5 8
The right to petition the Crown for a redress of grievances was enunci-
ated in Magna Carta in 1215.r9 The right exerted influence on the
legislative, judicial, and executive processes of the government, and
came to be recognized as a fundamental right of the subject. ° The
Bill of Rights of 1689, therefore, did not create the right of petition,
but merely ratified it6' by providing: "That it is the right of the sub-
jects to petition the King, and all commitments and prosecutions for
such petitioning are illegal."62
This right to petition for a redress of grievances was employed by
5S3 Sarlls v. State ex rel. Trimble, 210 Ind. 88, 166 N.E. 270 (1929); Ex parte
Wilson, 7 Okla. Crim. 610, 125 Pac. 739 (1912).
54 Britton v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 129 Cal. 337, 342, 61 Pac. 1115, 1117
(1900).
55 Davidson v. Hanson, 87 Minn. 211, 92 N.W. 93 (1902).
56 Abernathy, The Right of Association, 6 S.C.L.Q. 32, 42 (1953).
57 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-66 (1958).
58 D. BLAiSDELL, Am cAN DEmIocRAcy UNDER PREssuRE 93 (1957).
59 R. PERRY, SouncEs OF OuRs LERTms 21 (1959).
60 See ADAMs, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 245 (1921); U.S. SENATE,
THE CONsTrrUnoN OF THE UN=TED STATEs OF AMEnucA 914-15 (2d ed. Small & Jayson
1964).




the American colonists in complaining to King George 111.6" The
First Continental Congress, in its Declaration and Resolves, showed
the connection between the right of assembly and the right of peti-
tion.64 The first amendment to the Constitution reaffirmed the right
of petition, but in language which left some doubt about its purpose
and relation to the right of assembly.6 5 That this language consti-
tuted the right of petition as the primary right, and the right of as-
sembly as the ancillary right, thereby guaranteeing a right to assemble
in order to petition the national government, was indicated by the
Supreme Court in 1875.66 This restricted right of assembly, though
seemingly accurate in a historical sense,67 has yielded today to a rec-
ognition that the right of assembly, for any lawful purpose, "is a right
cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally funda-
mental."6 The right of petition, too, underwent an expansion, so that
it is no longer confined to rather negative demands "for a redress of
grievances," 69 but includes as well the right to ask for active and posi-
tive government intervention in aid of the interest or objective pro-
moted by the petitioners.70 Today there are many thousands of volun-
tary, non-profit associations, of all sorts and purposes. In one way or
another, each of these is actually or potentially a pressure group.71
That there is a fundamental right to form and join them cannot be
questioned. 2
This basic right to form and join voluntary associations, as estab-
lished by the legal history of the pressure group, is not immune from
reasonable restrictions, such as those found in regulations of lobbying
6 3 See id. at 271 for resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress of 1765.
64
"That they have a right peaceably to assemble, consider of their grievances,
and petition the King ...... R. PERRY, SoxmcEs or Our LmERTIEs 288 (1959).
,65"Congress shall make no law . . . abridgiing . . . the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6G6United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552-53 (1875).
67 See BLAISDELL, A NmcAN DEMocmAcY UNDER PnFssunn 94 (1957).
68 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (embodied in the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment).
69 U.S. CONST. amend I.
70 See U.S. SENATE, THE CoNsTrrTIoN OF THE UNITED STATES OF AmEICA-
ANALYSIS AND INTERPBETATION (2d ed. Small & Jayson 1964) which draws this con-
clusion at 915. The cases leading to this conclusion are discussed at 915-20.
71 See BONE, AmucAu PoLrrcs AN THE PARTY SYsTEM 71-72 (2d ed. 1955);
McICE r, PArY ANm PnEssuRE PoLrrics 430 (1949); Abernathy, The Right of As-
sociation, 6 S.C.L.Q. 32, 41-42 (1953).
72 See Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice v. Shapiro, 9 N.Y.2d
376, 174 N.E.2d 487, 214 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1961).
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in Congress 73 and state legislatures. 74 It is clear, none the less, that the
fundamental right has long existed and enjoyed the sanction of the law.
What is no less clear is the utility of voluntary groups as inter-
mediate agents in the body politic. As the nation sets its course toward
the Great Society, it becomes apparent that the specifics of .that goal
are to be attained through the agency of a substantial, and unprec-
edented, peacetime accretion of power to the federal government.
The wide assumption by Washington of social functions heretofore
primarily performed by private groups, in education, medicine,
social welfare and other fields, poses the possibility that voluntary in-
termediate groups may atrophy and lose their effectiveness as pluralis-
tic repositories of meaningful responsibilities. It ought to be the con-
cern of lawmakers and students of the law to ensure that, through a
proper respect for the principle of subsidiarity, voluntary groups retain
their vitality.75 For that vitality is, in a sense, an index of the state
of individual liberty in any commonwealth. Significantly, when the
radical intellectuals of the French Revolution found the National As-
sembly at their disposal, one of their early actions, in 1789, was to dis-
solve at a stroke all trade guilds, corporations and unions.76 The Loi
Chapelier 77 further prohibited the formation of corporate bodies, pro-
fessional associations, trade unions, and similar bodies. 78
While voluntary groups merit our concern for their preservation,
they bear a concomitant responsibility. It is not within the compass
of these general remarks to comment in detail upon this aspect of the
problem. However, candor compels the parenthetical assertion that it
is in the field of racial relations, more than in any other today, that
private groups have defaulted in discharging their responsibilities to
the public. This stricture has particular reference to some of the pres-
78 See Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act §§ 301-11, 60 Stat. 839 (1946),
2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1958); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
74 See BoNE, op. cit. supra note 71, at 207.
75 In sharp .point of fact, of course, the federal government today possesses the
power to curtail, and even terminate, the effective existence of many private non-
profit organizations through the selective granting or withholding of income tax
exemptions. Regardless of the political views involved, we ought to scrutinize carefully
the recent action of the Administration in terminating the tax exemptions of some
conservative organizations for alleged political activity. A number of other tax-exempt
organizations openly supported President Johnson in the 1964 campaign, 'but the
Internal Revenue Service apparently has not challenged their tax privileges. See N.Y.
Times, Nov. 17, 1964, p. 22, col. 3.
76 See DcEY, LAw AND Punuc OPINIoN IN ENcLAND 469 (1926).
77 June 14-17, 1791.
78 See CAHN, THE PREDIcAmNT OF DnmocATric MAN 100 (1961); Drcz-, op. cit.
supra note 76, at 469; DuGurr, L w IN THE MODERN STATE 111 (1919).
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sure groups on both sides of the civil rights controversy. We have seen
on the one hand covert appeals to racial prejudice under the cloak of
advancing the cause of individual freedom of choice. On the other
hand we find an exaggerated emphasis upon racial sins and alleged
"rights" to an extent where the civil rights movement has assumed in
some quarters eccentric and revolutionary proportions. The net effect
of the widespread abuse of the right of association in this area predict-
ably will be the generation in the American people of a color-con-
sciousness so deep that the elimination of it will be the work of gen-
erations yet unborn."9
"Subversive" Associations
But if the pre-1958 history of labor unions and pressure groups
evidences the existence of a basic freedom of association for many
years before the Supreme Court declared it, the chronicle of subver-
sive associations is markedly different in effect. For, in that category,
American law has never formally recognized a fundamental right of
subversive association.80 From the Alien and Sedition Laws8l to the
Civil War experience, 2 through World War 1,83 the rise of criminal
anarchism and criminal syndicalism,84 the Ku Klux Klan agitation
in the 1920's85 and the Nazi activity prior to and during World War-
II,86 there was a clear recognition in the law that some associational
activities were so inimical to the prevailing requirements of public
order and safety, that one undertook them only at his peril. Through
79 So far there has not emerged any effective champion of the ideal of color
blindness advanced by Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
8oMr. Justice Brandeis hinted at a possibly different approach in 1927 when he
stated that he was "unable to assent to the suggestion . . . that assembling with
a political party, formed to advocate the desirability of a proletarian revolution by
mass action at some date necessarily far in the future, is not a right within the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 379
(1927) (concurring opinion). Compare Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
811 Stat. 566, 570, 577 (1798).
82See generally RANDALL, CoNSTrunoNArL PROBLEmS UNDER LincoLN (1951).
83 See Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918); Orear v. Unted States,
261 Fed. 257 (5th Cir. 1919); Wells v. United States, 257 Fed. 605 (9th Cir. 1919);
Bryant v. United States, 257 Fed. 378 (5th Cir. 1919).
84 See generally DoWELL, A HISTORY Or CRMxNAL SYNDICALISM LEGSLATIoN 3H
UNrrEo STA rs (The John Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political
Science Series LVII No. 1, 1939).
85 See, e.g., New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
86 See Note, Recent Legislative Attempts to Curb 'Subversive Activities in the
United States, 10 GEo. WAss. L. REv. 104 (1941).
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World War I, the primary restrictive weapon was legislation punishing
active subversive conspiracy on the part of the individual defendant.s7
The restrictive legislation aimed at the criminal syndicalist and crim-
inal anarchist movements provides the first significant example of
punishment imposed for membership, as such, in a subversive group. 8
Similar strictures were imposed upon members of the Ku Klux Klan"'
and, by the Smith Act, upon members of Communist, Nazi, and Fascist
groups." Similarly, the Voorhis Act, effective January 15, 1941, re-
quired registration with the Attorney General, and the filing of de-
tailed information including membership lists, by certain types of
political organizations subject to forleign control, certain types of polit-
ical or foreign-controlled organizations engaged also in military ac-
tivity, and organizations which aim to forcibly overthrow the govern-
ment 1 Alien members of Communist, Nazi, or Fascist associations
were subject to exclusion from the country -92 and, if they were
87 For example, the Conspiracies Act of July 31, 1861, provided in part, "if two
or more persons . . . shall conspire together to overthrow, or to put down, or to
destroy by force, the Government of the United States, or to levy war against the
'United States, or to oppose by force the authority of the Government of the United
States; or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United
'States . . . each and every person so offending . . . shall be punished by a fine . . . or
by imprisonment .... " 12 Stat. 284, upheld in In re Impaneling and Instructing the
Grand Jury, 26 Fed. 749 (D. Ore. 1886). The Espionage Act of 1917 read in part,
"if two or more persons conspire to violate the provisions . . . of this title, and one
or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of
the parties to such conspiracy shall be punished .... " 40 Stat. 219.
88 "Any person who . . . (4) Organizes or assists in organizing, or is or knowingly
becomes a member of, any organization, society, group or assemblage of persons
organized or assembled to advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal syndicalism . . . is
guilty of a felony .... " CAL. PEN. CODE § 11401, upheld in Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357 (1927). Scienter was found to be a requirement of the statute. Compare
the result in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
89 See N.Y. Crv. Rrcrrrs LAw §§ 53-57.
90 Alien Registration Act (Smith Act) § 2, 54 Stat. 671 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 2385
(1958), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. V, 1964).
9154 Stat. 1201 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 2386. The statute defines the scope of political
activity to which it applies. At its convention in November, 1940 the Communist Party,
U.S.A., resolved: "That the Communist Party of the U.S.A., in convention assembled,
does hereby cancel and dissolve its organizational affiliation to the Communist Inter-
national ... for the specific purpose of removing itself from the terms of the so-called
Voorhis Act." The Subversive Activities Control Board found, however, that this tactic
did not alter the domination of the Communist Party, U.S.A., by the Communist
International. INTEaNAL Scunr-rY Suucozmn., SENATE CoMMa. ON THE JUnxICAnY,
84TH CONG., 1ST. SESS., REPORT ON THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES
or AMEmucA 2 (Comm. Print 1955).
02 Alien Registration Act, ch. 439, § 23(a), 54 Stat. 673 (1940) (now Im-
migration and Nationality Act § 212(d)(2), 66 Stat. 187 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(d)(2) (1958)).
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naturalized, they were liable, in some instances, to denaturaliza-
tion.93
In 1951, in Dennis v. United States,94 the Supreme Court upheld
the convictions of eleven leading members of the Communist Party on
a charge of conspiring to violate the substantive provisions of the Smith
Act. Even more stringent anti-Communist legislation was enacted
in the early fiftiesY5 In 1957 the conspiracy provisions of the Smith
Act were restrictively construed by the Court in Yates v. United
States,96 holding that Congress intended to punish the advocacy only
of concrete action for the forcible overthrow of the government and
not mere advocacy of forcible overthrow as an abstract doctrine. 7
Nevertheless, the conclusion is justified from the principal cases de-
cided prior to 1958, that the law theretofore definitely did not rec-
ognize in principle a basic right of subversive association. Indeed, with
few exceptions, the courts legitimized and implemented severely
hostile legislation directed against such groups and their members.
Nor does the case law subsequent to the Supreme Court's first
explicit recognition in 1958 of "freedom to engage in association for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas," 8 support the notion that sub-
versive groups will be accorded the same fundamental freedom of as-
sociation long extended implicitly, and explicitly after 1958, to other
organizations.99 And it could not logically be otherwise. There cannot
be a constitutionally protected right to join or support a subversive
association which levels a fundamental attack at the state itself and
its government. The Constitution cannot consistently contain within
itself detailed provisions for its permanent endurance unto genera-
tions yet unborn and at the same time legitimize the efforts of those
who would disregard those provisions and overturn its very founda-
tions. Mr. Justice Frankfurter approached the issue in the Dennis
case, where he observed that "no government can recognize a 'right'
of revolution, or a 'right' to incite revolution if the incitement has no
93 See Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944).
94341 U.S. 494 (1951).
95 E.g., Subversive Activities Control Act, 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-
98 (1958); Communist Control Act, 68 Stat. 775 (1954), 50 U.S.C. §§ 841-44 (1958).
90354 U.S. 298 (1957).
97 Id. at 320.
98 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
99 See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); In re Anastaplo, 366
U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Braden v. United States,
365 U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Nelson v.
County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
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other purpose or effect."00 The Constitution provides measures, such
as frequent elections and judicial review, to forestall usurpation and
abuse. It sanctifies neither a despotism imposed in its name nor the
efforts of those who would pervert constitutional guarantees to cloak
their conspiracy to destroy the Constitution itself. This is especially
true of a foreign-directed conspiracy such as the Communist enter-
prise.101 At the same time, however, it must be recognized that mea-
sures taken against even subversive associations must conform to the
basic standards governing governmental action in general, such as
due process and the first amendment freedoms of speech and press.
The problem here as in similar areas is one of balancing between
the state's right and duty to preserve itself and the asserted individual
or associative freedom of expression and action.'
The suspicion is merited that in recent years the Supreme Court
has shrunk from a frank intellectual confrontation with the realities
of the Communist problem. A case in point is Aptheker v. Secretary
of State,1 3 where the Court reversed the denial of passports, pur-
suant to section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,104
to Herbert Aptheker, editor of the Communist Party's theoretical
journal, Political Affairs, and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, the Party chair-
man. 0 5 In Aptheker, the Court, with Justices Clark, Harlan, and
White dissenting, refused to construe the statute as applied to the
petitioners and instead, construing it on its face in a manner normally
reserved for the preferred freedoms of the first amendment, 16 ruled
the section unconstitutional on its face since it "too broadly and indis-
criminately restricts the right to travel and thereby abridges the lib-
erty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment."07
100 341 U.S. at 549 (concurring opinion).
1 0 1 See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 174-75
(1961) for an acknowledgment by Justice Douglas, who dissented on fifth amendment
grounds from the majority's upholding of the Control Board's registration order, that
foreign control makes theCommunist Party particularly vulnerable to regulation.
102 See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
103 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
10464 Stat. 993 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1958).
105 Miss Flynn is since deceased and, incidentally, she was cremated in Moscow,
where her ashes were honored in a ceremony at the Kremlin. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9,
1964, p. 3, col. 1.
106 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 ('1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
107378 U.S. at 505. See also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), in which
the Court invalidated, as 'unconstitutionally vague, a Washington State loyalty oath,
required of state employees and teachers, which was identical to a Maryland oath which,
in the view of dissenting Justices Clark and Harlan, had been sustained against a
vagueness attack in Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 (1951)
(per curiam).
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A basic note of unreality is struck by the Court's refusal to no-
lice judicially the nature and effect of the Communist Party and its
general operations. In cases involving the membership clause of the
Smith Act, for example, the Court, applying the evidentiary require-
ments enunciated in -the conspiracy case of Yates v. United States,108
requires that, in each case, it must be shown that the Communist Party
advocates the unlawful, forcible overthrow of the government and,
secondly, that the particular defendant has the necessary knowledge
and intent.10 9 The finding of unlawful advocacy by the Party, however,
must be made only on the basis of the evidence in the record of the
instant case "and not upon the evidence in some other record or upon
what may be supposed to be the tenets of the Communist Party."110
This rule overlooks the technique of judicial notice, which was em-
ployed in 1928 in People ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman"' to support the
determination of the New York State Legislature that the Ku Klux
Klan is engaged in such invidious advocacy and activity that it ought
to be required to. disclose its membership."2 The result now is that
if two members of the Communist Party are prosecuted under the
membership provisions of the Smith Act in separate trials, and the
evidence in each case sufficiently shows that each defendant has the
necessary knowledge and intent, one may be convicted and one may
be acquitted because of variances in the proofs of the common issue
of whether the same Party is engaged in unlawful advocacy." 3 More-
I08 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
109 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 254-55 (1961).
110 Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961). See also Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298, 329-30 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 512-13
(1951).
111278 U.S. 63, 76-77 (1928).
112The statute in Zimmerman made continued membership in an organization
ordered to register, with knowledge that the organization has failed to register, a
misdemeanor. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LA W § 56. The Zimmerman case, therefore, does not
limit the technique of judicial notice to a non-criminal proceeding.
113 In the Noto case, the conviction of Noto was reversed because the Party was
not shown, on the record, to be engaged in illegal advocacy. 367 U.S. at 299. In fact,
the proof of his own knowledge and intent was also lacking, so that there could have
been no conviction even if the Party's advocacy had been proven. But if Noto's knowl-
edge and intent had been proven, the defendant in the companion Scales case, whose
conviction was upheld, would have been punished, while Noto would have been
freed because of a failure in the proof of a common issue. This analysis assumes, of
course, that the local units of the Party in which defendants were members were
both engaged in unlawful advocacy. It may be unfeasible to notice judicially the
nature of the advocacy and activity of a local or state branch of the Party, even if
the Court were to notice the nature and purpose of the Party as a whole. Even if
the Court should notice judicially the national character of the Party, it would be
preferable to require some actual proof on the record as to the "conspiratorial-nexus,"
367 U.S. at 231, between the local branch and the national Party.
I
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over, the requirement of separate proof in each case on this issue
imposes an unnecessary burden upon the government, without justifi-
able benefit to the accused, requiring a parade of witnesses in each
case to testify on the specific applications of the Marxist-Leninist
dogma and the activities of the Party which are, or at least ought to
be, common knowledge for every schoolboy. The various congres-
sional declarations as to the nature of Communism and the purposes
and activities of the Communist Party of the United States 14 are at
least as supportable from common knowledge as were the conclusions
of the New York State legislature concerning the Ku Klux Klan. This
matter of judicial notice then, is one in which a more realistic ap-
proach to the problem of law enforcement may be possible without
an infringement of properly-conceived rights of defendants or of
voluntary associations in general.
Conclusion
The subject of unincorporated non-profit associations is a large
one, and involves many more types of organizations than have been
specifically discussed here. Rather than attempt an inclusive survey
of the area, it is the burden of this article to show the existence of a
basic freedom of association, applicable to all such groups, and to sug-
gest areas in which the vitality of intermediate groups is encouraged
or endangered by current legal developments. Because the freedom
of association has been most sharply defined in rdlation to labor
unions, pressure groups and "subversive" associations, the status of
those groups has been specifically examined here. This is not to imply
that they are the only significant unincorporated, non-profit associa-
tions, nor that they are typical. Their development, and problems, are
discussed merely to sketch the character of the underlying freedom
of association and, in the case of the subversive groups, to show that
the freedom is not indiscriminately recognized and is not without
limitation. Hopefully, a greater awareness of the freedom of associa-
tion and its corollaries will contribute to a clarification of the position
of voluntary associations in general and to the responsible fulfillment
of the functions which are properly theirs.
114 E.g., 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1958); 68 Stat. 775 (1954),
50 U.S.C. § 841 (1958).
